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A
H I N T

T O A

PATRIOT PARLIAMENT.

L O N D O N.

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H I N T, &c.

AS it is the duty of every individual to contribute to the happiness and prosperity of his country, the author of the following pages will make no apology, for suggesting an expedient which seems to promise much improvement to the exertions of official zeal.—The nation, at present, has built the strongest hopes, and it is believed on the fairest foundations,

that the present Ministry possess every requisite, both of head and heart, to restore this kingdom to it's former splendor. The greater reason we have for these expectations, the more probable is it that such a Ministry will patronize every idea that is promotive of the public good.

The noble and unremitted opposition which they maintained when out of office, against the late calamitous measures, though they might so easily have sheltered themselves under the still, but inglorious, shade of various lucrative employments, sufficiently acquits them of those views of interest, which are generally understood by that name—but, if we except pecuniary views, there is no doubt

doubt but they have been stimulated by self-interest, in a philosophical sense, in common with all mankind — The interest they felt nearest their hearts, was either to gratify their abhorrence of bad men or bad measures, or to gratify their love for their country, or their ambition to be the instruments of saving her from impending ruin : — These are all private gratifications; and, as Othello says,

Where virtue is, these are most virtuous.

For from these springs, as well as from the lure of wealth, are derived all the blessings of social order. However pure the source of such patriotism, or however superior they may feel themselves to a proposition

position of a very different nature, yet if it should come dignified with the sanction of the representatives of the people, it will of course be attended with such good and weighty reasons, as will induce an honorable acquiescence.

In the present state of things, the evil consequences of a bad administration, seldom come home to the ministers themselves, till the nation is so much impoverished, and disgraced, that their dismissal, or even punishment, scarce deserves the name of an atonement. In the unhappy progress of its disasters, they are very little affected by them. Perhaps they even riot amidst the evils they have occasioned. Perhaps their incomes, by the
manœuvres

manœuvres of iniquity, are increased, and the corruption necessary to engage a party, to keep them in their places, is productive of new taxes, on a people, too much exhausted already.

What then can be done to controul such ministers, entrenched behind all the powers of their office, and to convert those powers to the benefit of the public? As to the first, we have every reason to form the most sanguine expectations, from the scheme of reformation, contained in that excellent speech of Mr. Burke, on the 11th of February, 1780, which would leave the great officers of state little opportunity of injuring their country; but every official power of benefiting it. When the

Right

Right Honourable Gentleman, shall have completed that part of his plan intended to controul ministers, the second object proposed in the following Hint, that of converting the powers they are vested with to the benefit of the public, by an establishment which may operate to that effect, will very naturally coincide with his main view, the promoting fidelity, œconomy, and zeal, in the servants of the people. To a Patriot Parliament, therefore, this proposal is submitted, and for very obvious reasons such a measure would come with more propriety from some independent member of the House of Commons, than from Mr. Burke himself, should it even
be

be honoured with that gentleman's approbation or improvement.

Helvetius observes, that “ les hommes,
 “ sont fournis a leurs interets, les cris des
 “ moralistes ne changeront certainement
 “ pas ce ressort de l'univers moral, ce n'est
 “ point donc de la mechanceté des hom-
 “ mes dont il faut se plaindre, mais de
 “ l'ignorance des législateurs qui ont tou-
 “ jours mises l'interet particulier en op-
 “ position avec l'interet general.” The
 point then is, to unite the particular inte-
 rests with the general. In the speech above
 alluded to, page 84, Mr. Burke confirms
 this doctrine, and says, “ I know of no
 “ mode of preserving the effectual execu-
 “ tion of any duty, but to make it the *direct*
 B “ *interest*

“ *interest* of the executive officer, that it
 “ should be faithfully performed,” and
 a little further, on the same subject of
 making a minister’s salary depend on his
 merit, “ this classing, is, in my opinion,
 “ a *serious and solid security* for the per-
 “ formance of a minister’s duty,” i. e. in
 the œconomical disbursement of the sums
 allotted to the civil list.

Under the sanction of such respectable
 authorities, and of maxims so justly dedu-
 ced from the nature of mankind, the au-
 thor presumes that a plan might be hit
 upon, which, in its effects would be pro-
 ductive of the most important and perma-
 nent benefits to the whole kingdom.

It

It is well known that the fluctuation in the price of stocks is the great political barometer of our national distresses or prosperity. As that sinks, public and private credit sink too, the value of land is reduced, personal property suffers with it ; circulation is stopped, manufactures stand still, trade grows languid, the produce of the land will not defray the expences of it ; even labour cannot find employment, and the burthen of the poor, increases with the inability to support them. This is the disastrous outline of the evil consequences of a bad administration.

It is therefore submitted to the wisdom of parliament, that some mode should be adopted to make the salaries of the efficient

ministers rise or fall with the good or bad fortune, which their administration might produce; and as the price of stock is the infallible criterion of both, that the three per cents. consol. should regulate the quantum of their respective salaries. The effect arising from the mere novelty of such an idea, will wear off after a little consideration, especially if the benefit expected to be derived from it should be found something more than speculative.

Setting aside all fractions of halves and quarters, suppose for every hundred pounds salary now enjoyed by different ministers (for the proposal is not intended for any persons who do not strictly come under that description) that they were to receive
double

double the current price of the abovementioned stock. As a starting point, let it be stated at fifty-five, the price it bore when the late Ministry were dismissed, their salaries would, on that supposition, amount to one hundred and ten pounds for every hundred, which rising as that stock may rise, and taken at an average of two or three months, would produce the following advance upon every thousand, viz.

Price of Stock	Salaries of			
	1000	2000	3000	4000
—	—	—	—	—
55	1100	2200	3300	4400
56	1120	2240	3360	4480
57	1140	2280	3420	4560

Price of Stock

Salaries of

	1000	2000	3000	4000
—	—	—	—	—
58 .	1160 .	2320 .	3480 .	4640
59 .	1180 .	2360 .	3540 .	4720
60 .	1200 .	2400 .	3600 .	4800
65 .	1300 .	2600 .	3900 .	5200
70 .	1400 .	2800 .	4200 .	5600
80 .	1600 .	3200 .	4800 .	6400
100 .	2000 .	4000 .	6000 .	8000

Though the above advance in the salaries of ministers is a very considerable object to individuals, yet it bears no proportion to the very extensive advantages which the public would reap from such a state of prosperity as would once more raise

raise the stocks to par. The consequences which would attend this event to every class of men, would exhibit the very reverse of the sketch which has been given of a bad administration, and which we have unfortunately seen realized through the fatal mismanagement of the last.

From the date of such an establishment, we may flatter ourselves with the prospect of unanimity in ministers, in the prosecution of any plan that would redound to the benefit of the public—That a *consolidation of interest* will create a consolidation of strength—That every nerve would be strained to raise the glory of the kingdom to the highest pitch possible—That they

Would

would each, in their several departments, select men of the most approved abilities, and best adapted to the offices they are employed in—That an impolitic measure which would of course militate against the interests of every minister, must on a double account, engage a strenuous and successful opposition in the Cabinet, while the languid councils of submissive dependants would be wakened into attention and zeal, because real service would be sure of being preferred to abject obedience. On such a basis, public credit might lift up her head as high as at any former period, and foreigners contribute to her support, by pouring their treasures into the English funds.

funds. Even at last, if by the prosperity of the kingdom, the salaries of ministers, as well as their honours, by becoming an object of envy, should fall a prey to the intrigues of a new set,—their successors would be almost *compelled* to tread in the same glorious steps, through the fear of diminishing their incomes in proportion to their ill conduct—especially if the present constellation of patriots shall have guarded all the avenues to the future misapplication of the civil list revenue.

It is reported that the First Lord of the Treasury is so greatly disinterested in his services to the public, that he does not

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
intend

intend to receive the ordinary emoluments of his office. — On a mind so elevated, a proposal of this sort can have no effect. — But a princely ambition is not always attended with a princely fortune. — A future Prime Minister may find those emoluments as necessary to his domestic happiness (while his attention is employed in higher concerns) as his abilities may be necessary to the happiness of the public. For this reason, the same public spirit which prompts the noble Marquis to refuse his own salary, ought to engage him to secure an honorable provision to his successor. And if it can be done in a mode that shall rouse the attention of
bad

bad ministers, or become a scourge more efficacious than their consciences, it will prove a "*serious and solid security*" for the glory and prosperity of the empire.

Elmrood Grange,
April 18, 1782.

F I N I S.



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